There are different categories of persons involved in the execution of the company's affairs, but not all have the capacity to bind the company as the embodiment of the company itself. Those who exercise acts of management and control over the company's business are usually referred to as the directors. Where persons who satisfy the statutorily prescribed qualification standard are duly appointed by the shareholders to exercise control and manage the affairs of the company function in that capacity, they are usually identified as de jure directors. But where there is no such appointment, or irregular appointment, the law demands, for the protection of those dealing with the company, that the role performed by the person be examined to ascertain whether such a person is a de facto director. The more difficult part lies in identifying a de facto director where the subject company has a corporate body as its director. The extant judicial authority suggests that the human person in the corporate director must be performing functions which are beyond the natural call of duty in relation to the corporate director to constitute a de facto director of the subject company. The paper argues that the standard is satisfied in any case where the human person is involved in the initiation and execution of the affairs of the subject company, and more so where the conducts of the subject company are patently unlawful.
INTRODUCTION
A company by its nature provides an avenue for investment opportunities. These opportunities are actualized by persons who subscribe for the company's shares. But those subscribers (shareholders) are by contrast not always in a position to manage their investment in there capacities as such. Indeed, the individual conducts of the shareholders are not binding on, and usually not enforceable against, the company. The legal recognition of the distinction between ownership and control invariably springs up issues of accountability. Those that control and manage the affairs of the company must be accountable to, not only the owners of the company, but to others who may have dealings with the company, and exceptionally to those who look up to the company for the provision of goods and services in the community (stakeholders). Accountability is an essential arm of corporate governance. The demands of accountability increasingly channel the minds of those entrusted with management and control of the company to the expectations on them by the shareholders and stakeholders and compel them to address the right preferences in the conduct of the company's affairs. This, however, does not warrant any undue encroachment on the exercise of discretion by the managers, as such discretion which is embedded in their given talents, forms the basis for entrusting the conduct of the company's affairs on such managers. 1 
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The legal separation of ownership from management requires the defining of the status of the managers. Prior to the legislative intervention, the common law had recognized the managers of the corporate enterprise as the directors. 2 Cairns LJ had observed in Ferguson v Wilson 3 that the company itself cannot act in its own person, for it has no person; it can only act through directors. Lord Wensleydale had similarly recognized in Ernest v Nicholls 4 that for the purposes of contract, the company exists only in the directors and officers acting by and according to the deed; and by the statute law the company is no more than liable than a corporation by charter for the act of one or more of its members, who are distinct persons by law.
This judicial position is now strengthened by modern company legislation. In both United Kingdom and South Africa, companies, whether public or private, are statutorily compelled to operate at all times with a prescribed minimum number of directors. 5 The statutes in both jurisdictions have similarly recognized that the directors are vested with the management powers of the company.
safely be assumed that every person involved in the management of the company's business is invariably a director. Moreover, judicial decisions have shown that one could be a director even without satisfying some of the statutorily prescribed eligibility test, and even when having not been appointed as such. Thus, the paper is geared at discovering whom the directors of the company are, with specific attention paid on those usually referred to by the courts as de facto directors.
CONSTRUING THE CONCEPT OF DIRECTOR
The term 'director' simple though it may seem, has become one of those nebulous concepts in company law. The root of the ambiguity associated with that term could be traced back to the evolutionary stages of corporate law and practice when corporations had employed different acronyms in their deed of settlement such as board of governors, governing council, or board of management and such other similar terms in referring to the controlling officers of the company. In Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co 7 Jessel MR had alluded to those indiscriminate acronyms where he observed that:
Directors have sometimes been called trustees, or commercial trustees, and sometimes they have been called managing partners, it does not matter what you call them so long as you understand what their true position is, which is that they are really commercial men managing a trading concern for the benefit of themselves and of all the other shareholders in it. 8 But a 'manager' or 'men managing a trading concern' whether for the benefit of themselves or for other persons' benefit, as referred to by Jessel MR, are not invariably directors. The responsibilities of a manager and his level of dependence or taking of instruction from others in the discharge of such responsibilities could in some cases more appropriately situate him as a servant rather than a director of a company. Mallish LJ had in an earlier decision in Re Marseilles Extension Rly 9 defined a director simply as a person appointed to act as one of a board and with power to bind the company when acting as a board. While issue of appointment is left for a later discussion, the concern at the moment is that a director should possess the power to bind the company when acting as a board. The inference from that definition is that the binding effect of the conduct of the person occupying the office or position of a company director lies not on agency as such, but as human element or an embodiment of the company itself. Perhaps, an excursion into the evolution of the rules of 7 (1878) 10 Ch D 450 at 451-452. 8 But what is the rationale for defining a director as including a wife, husband, father, mother, son or daughter of a director, as in s 29 of Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks, Decree no. 18 of 1994, (a Nigerian statute promulgated by the military government) now reenacted as an Act of the National Assembly, s 23(b) contained in Cap F2 Vol 6 LFN 2004. In ACB v Okonkwo [1997] 1 NWLR (pt 480) 149 at 208, the Nigerian Court of Appeal, per Tobi JCA, had described the police action of holding a mother responsible for the crime committed by his son as a most uncivilised conduct and one that any person with a democratic mind should thoroughly detest and condemn. Cf Co-op Bank Ltd v Obokhare [1996] 18 NWLR (pt 468) 579 at 588 paras. D-F per lge JCA who stated obiter, that if the respondent was a failed Bank, the appellant would perhaps have been justified in going against the properties of the respondent's relations to execute judgment obtained against the respondent. This type of legislation can only be explained as an extraordinary legislation intended to address extraordinary situation and should not be seen as laying a standard to be applied in a normal situation. 9 (1871) LR 7 Ch App 161 at 168. attribution of human conduct to the corporate entity in finding corporations criminally responsible would greatly assist in disserting this line of thought.
In its early stages of evolution, the very artificial nature of the corporation had posed the greatest obstacle in imposing criminal liabilities on corporations. This was hinged on the moral or blameworthy element of the concept of criminal law which is absent in the artificial entity. Williams credited Baron Thurlow with a statement reflecting corporate criminal impossibility to the effect that corporations have "no soul to be damned; no body to be kicked", 10 and "they cannot be excommunicated, for they have no souls" 11 These are reflections of the maxim of criminal law that "the deed does not make a man guilty unless his mind be guilty". 12 But this was not to endure for long as the courts began to rationalize the essence of the human element in the corporate arrangement which confers benefits on the corporation through the conduct of its human agencies. It stands to reason that if corporations could benefit from the skills of its human elements, it should also bear the burden arising from the criminal conducts of such individuals, not just on the bases that they acted for the company (which imputes vicarious liability), but that they acted as the company. 13 The English courts were however not inclined to attributing the fault of every servant or employee of the corporation on the corporation. A distinction was made between those who made company's decisions and those who executed them. In the parlance of the cases, the former are 'minds' of the corporation; the latter are merely its 'hands'. 14 21 and further stressed that the corporation could be criminally liable where the fault emanated from those that could be referred to as the directing mind of the corporation, those whose mental element could be attributed to the corporation. Their Lordships upheld the company's appeal in that case on the ground that the branch manager of the company was not such a person whose fault could be attributed to the company. He took instructions from and was controlled by the board. He was not delegated any powers of the board and as such not a directing mind and will of the company. He was "another person" within the contemplations of the Act 22 that created the offence. This judicial approach was religiously observed by the courts to the extent that defences were not afforded to the company in statutory offences where the 'directing mind' was actually defrauding the company as illustrated by the case of Moore v I. Bresler Ltd 23 where a corporation was charged with knowingly making a false return under a taxing statute. The corporation alleged that the director who filed the returns acted in fraud of the corporation and as such the corporation should not be held liable. The court, per Viscount Caldecote LCJ, held: "those sales of the company's goods were made by those persons as agents of and with the authority of the respondents, and the sale is not less made with the authority of the master because the employee means to put into his own pocket the proceeds of the sale when he receives them." His Lordship depicted those officers as the human elements of the company and whose acts must be attributed to the company where he said: "[t]hese two men were important officials of the company, and when they made statements and rendered returns, they were clearly making those statements and giving those returns as the officers of the company, the proper officers to make the returns. Their acts therefore… were the acts of the company." 24 Generally, the more recent decisions of the English Courts reflect a significant shift from the Tesco's case and an adoption of a level of flexibility which gives considerable attention to the peculiar facts and surrounding circumstances of individual cases. The Privy Council adopted this new trend in
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where the court held that in determining whether a company had failed to comply with a New Zealand statute which required it to give notice of being a substantial holder of securities in a public company as soon as it knew or 72 at 84 where Turner J in approving the earlier position of the English courts said that "where a corporation, through the controlling mind of its agents, does an act which fulfills the prerequisites of the crime of manslaughter, it is properly indictable for the crime of manslaughter." 21 See Lord Reid's statement at 170 as follows: "A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act through living persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind which directs his act is the mind of the company. There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company." 22 See ss 11 (2) and 24(1) of the UK Trade Descriptions Act 1968. 23 [1944] KB 515 at 516 (KBD). 24 Ibid. See also the concurring judgment of Humphrey J at 517. 25 [1995] 2 AC 500.
ought to have known that it had become one, the knowledge of the individual who had the authority to acquire the securities for the company, regardless of whether that individual was the directing mind or will, would be attributed to the company. Lord Hoffman, while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, stated: "[w]hose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc. of the company? One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual cannons of interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy."
26 His Lordship, however, emphasized that this guideline does not amount to a disregard of the extant principle but only lends credence to the peculiar circumstances of the individual case where he said:
But their Lordships would wish to guard themselves against being understood to mean that whenever a servant of a company has an authority to do an act on its behalf, knowledge of that act will for all purposes be attributed to the company. It is a question of construction in each case as to whether the particular rule requires that the knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which it is done, should be attributed to the company.
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In El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc 28 Hoffman LJ at the Court of Appeal had paid close attention to the pronouncement made by Viscount Haldane in Lennard's case from where he drew the inference that "the authorities show clearly that different persons may for different purposes satisfy the requirements of being the company's directing mind and will." Rose LJ also reached a similar conclusion in the same case after a painstaking analysis of the various speeches of their Lordships in Tesco's case. He said: "[t]here are, it seems to me, two points implicit, if not explicit in each of these passages. First, the directors of the company are prima facie likely to be regarded as 'its directing mind and will' whereas particular circumstances may confer that status on non-directors. Secondly, a company's directing mind and will' may be found in different persons for different activities of the company." 29 The Canadian position is encapsulated in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Canadian Dredge and Duck Co. v The Queen 30 where the court set down the conditions for the application of the identification doctrine as follows: (a) the act must be within the field of operation assigned to the directing mind; (b) must not be totally in fraud of the corporation; and (c) the company must have benefited from the act. Thus, unlike in Moore's case, a company could escape liability by showing that the conduct of the directing mind was actually targeted at the company and that the company did not derive any benefit even though the act was within the powers of the directing mind. The observation of Justice Estey in that case that the "application of the identification rule in Tesco, supra, may not accord with realities of life in our country [Canada] , however appropriate we may find to be the enunciation of the abstract principles of law there made", 31 is quite instructive. This was in recognition of the complexities of the corporate structure which may witness extensive delegation of authority, and geographical decentralization making it difficult to identify particular person(s) as the directing mind and will of the company. Thus, in Canada the court had no problem tracing the directing mind even below the top echelon of the corporate management depending on the manner of corporation's internal arrangement. 32 This principle was applied by the Canadian Supreme Court in The Rhone v The Peter A.B. Widener 33 with some level of unsatisfactory consequence. The facts are briefly that the defendant caused an accident in the high sea while the ship was under the control of Captain Kelch an employee of the corporate owner of the ship. The owner sought to limit its liability on the ground that the accident occurred without the corporation's "actual fault or privity" under section 647 (2) The bottom line to this decision is that Captain Kelch was a subordinate employee within that area of operation 35 and as such his conduct could not be attributed to the corporation. Implicit in the above decision is that it is simply not sufficient that an employee is acting within the scope of his authority, for the conduct of the employee to be attributed to the company, the employee must also be seen as the directing mind of the corporation who is not responsible to a senior officer. A person in such a position could properly be described as a director. The designation ascribed to the person by the company has no material consequence in determining his actual status.
36
In 41 Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC had held that "the plain intention of the Parliament … was to have regard to the conduct of a person acting as a director, whether validly appointed, invalidly appointed, or just assuming to act as director without any appointment at all." 'Having regard to the conduct of a person' enabled the court in that case to hold as a director, a person who was designated as the product manager of the company. Similarly, in Gibson v Barton 42 Blackburn J was convinced that the Secretary of the company to whom the entire management of the company was delegated, albeit improperly, by the board of directors, who had taken upon himself to act as sole manager, was rightly held liable under the relevant statute as the manager of the company.
It is logical that persons appointed or delegated power to act in a particular capacity should be accountable for the consequences of their conduct, or have such conduct elevated to the status of the position which those persons are intended to serve. There could, however, be occasions where no such 34 Ibid at 212-214. 35 Captain Kelch had described himself in evidence as "a funkie" whereas Captain Lloyd was "the operational manger 
DE FACTO DIRECTOR
Mallish LJ, as earlier shown, had in Re Marseilles Extension Rly 43 defined director simply as person 'appointed' to act as one of a board. Indeed, every director should normally be appointed or elected by the shareholders or by designated persons except perhaps the first directors who are usually named in the incorporation documents as part of the requirements for company's registration. 44 The companies' statutes in jurisdictions under consideration lay down rules for the appointment of directors. Every director duly and regularly appointed enjoy the status of a de jure director.
45
However, there could be persons in the company involved in the corporate governance but are not de jure directors. How such persons are treated are often a subject of judicial application of the existing legal principles to the facts of the particular cases.
The definition of director in the respective companies' statutes has adopted an inclusive rather than exhaustive approach to identifying those who act in that capacity. The reference to 'any person occupying the position of a director' in the respective Companies Act's definition seemingly prefers a functional approach rather than appointment in identifying the directors of a company. Thus a person could be a director of a company even when such a person has not been appointed or irregularly appointed to the position of a director, so long and only so long as that person performs or is performing the functions of a director. These category of persons are judicially referred to as de facto directors. a person who assumes to act as a director. He is held out as a director by the company, and claims and purports to be a director, although never actually or validly appointed as such. To establish that a person was a de facto director of a company it is necessary to plead and prove that he undertook functions in relation to the company which could properly be discharged only by a director. It is not sufficient to show that he was concerned in the management of the company's affairs or undertook tasks in relation to its business which can properly be performed by a manager below board level. The definition proffered by Millet J embodies the nature of proof required to establish that a person is a de facto director; whether it is by deficiency of qualification or by merely assuming the position of a director. The required proof is that the person 'undertook functions in relation to the company which could properly be discharged only by a director.' Whether or not the person is held out by the company cannot always be of material consequence when the facts are established. Indeed, in Hartrell v The Queen 49 Justice Paris had explicitly declined to accept the element of holding out as a prerequisite for establishing the existence of a de facto director status where he said:
However, in circumstances such as those in this case, where a corporation operates without having been properly organized and the only director of record plays no part in running the corporation, those persons who take it upon themselves to direct the affairs of the company may be held to be de facto directors, whether or not they have explicitly represented themselves as directors to any third party. The essential question is whether those individuals have, in fact, taken on the role of director of the corporation.
Evidence of holding out would, however, be crucial where the company is sought to be held liable for the conduct which the de facto director seemingly executed on behalf of the company, but not so important for determining the individual's personal accountability. Holding out would not necessarily require that power be expressly given, it would suffice that the company acquiesces in the conduct of the de facto director. Whichever manner the status of de facto director is acquired, whether by deficiency of qualification, usurping of office or holding out, it does not confer any benefit on the person as the real reason for the judicial device is to ensure protection for third parties who deal with persons who act as directors or who are held out by the company as directors though lack required qualification or authority. The business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, except to the extent that this Act or the company's Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.
The real import of a provision such as this, is that a director must be "a person who either alone or with others has ultimate control of the management of any part of the company's business." 51 The person need not be in control of the entire business of the company. In large companies where there are various branches and departments of the company's business, it is unimaginable that one person would control the entire business. But whatever the person does must be as such that it strikes at the "nerve centres from which the activities of the company radiated." 52 The person in question must be part of the corporate governance structure of the company. 53 In 
CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP AND DE FACTO DIRECTOR OF SUBJECT COMPANY
The juristic nature of the corporate entity which enables it to execute functions as a natural person also entails that the company, like a natural person, could assume roles as a director of another company. This is often the case where holding companies seek to maintain control over their subsidiaries. However, in South Africa a juristic person is not permitted by law to be a director of another company. 59 But a company is allowed to appoint directors on the board of another company. 60 If a company can appoint a director on the board of another company to represent the interest of the appointing company, what is the logic in depriving that company of the right to represent itself on the board? The reverse is the case under the UK Companies Act which permits the appointment of a corporate director on the board so long as at least one of the directors of the company is a natural person. 61 There is usually the question as to the status of the natural person who is behind the operations of the corporate director in its relationship with the subject company. Such was the case in Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd 62 where the liquidator sought to hold the natural persons who were directors of the holding company liable as de facto directors of the subject subsidiary company simply because they were among the human elements through whom the corporate director discharged its functions to the subject company. Millet J in declining to accept that proposition said:
The liquidator submitted that where a body corporate is a director of a company, whether it be a de jure, de facto or shadow director, its own directors must ipso facto be shadow directors of the company. In my judgment that simply does not follow. Attendance at board meetings and voting, with others, may in certain limited circumstances expose a director to personal liability to the company of which he is a director or its creditors. But it does not, without more, constitute him a director of any company of which his company is a director. that an isolated incident of signing a document and of the appellant introducing himself to a third party as a director were not sufficient to support the conclusion that the appellant was a de facto director. 59 S 69 (7) Lord Hope, in the majority decision, emphasized that "[t]he words 'without more' as stated by Millet J in Re Hydrodam are important. They indicate that the mere fact of acting as a director of a corporate director will not be enough for that individual to become a de facto director of the subject company." His Lordship had suggested, based on the facts of Holland's case, that the question whether Mr Holland was acting as a de facto director of the composite companies so as to impose on him fiduciary duties in relation to those companies when the purported directors' meetings were held on his direction at which the relevant dividends were declared must be approached on the basis that Paycheck Directors and Mr Holland were in law separate persons, each with their own separate legal personality. 65 Lord Collins had in a concurring decision drawn from an extensive historical excursion into the concept of de facto director, concluded that the condition 'without more' as laid down by Millet J in Re Hydrodam was not satisfied as " [t] here is no material to suggest that Mr Holland was doing anything other than discharging his duties as the director of the corporate director of the composite companies." 68 Those cases had expanded the scope of the concept of de facto director by including persons who are part of the corporate governance of the company though never appointed in that capacity, for the purposes of the application of statutory provisions relating to such matters as wrongful trading and disqualification of directors.
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But his Lordship expressed some reluctance in further extending that line of authority "so as to impose fiduciary duties on Mr Holland in relation to the composite companies, when all of his acts can be attributed in law solely to the activities of Paycheck Directors." He considers such stance as an unjustifiable judicial encroachment into the legislative arena. 70 Lord Walker in a dissenting opinion preferred a more pragmatic approach to this issue. He described the majority stance as "the most arid formalism". In agreeing with Lord Walker, Lord Clarke stated that it is indeed artificial and wrong to hold that Mr Holland was doing no more than merely discharging his duties as a de facto director of Paycheck Directors. In his Lordship's view, Mr Holland "was in fact acting as a director of the composite companies by deciding (after taking leading counsel's advice) that the composite companies should both continue trading and continue paying dividends without reserving for higher rate corporation tax and by procuring the directors of Paycheck Directors as a director of the composite companies to pay the unlawful dividends." 74 Lord Clarke had no difficulty, as envisaged by Lord Collins, in extending fiduciary duty to Mr Holland based on the premise that if Mr Holland had in fact deliberately procured the payment of the dividends by the directors of Paycheck Directors and had the de facto power to do so, he was a de facto director. As such, he owed a fiduciary duty to the company and the procuring of the payment of the dividends was a breach of fiduciary duty and an unlawful act. He is accordingly liable to restore the dividends. The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act. and prevent an unconscionable abuse of the corporate entity. 79 The manner of the incorporation of the multiplicity of the composite companies, the shareholding and management and control of the companies are reflections of a scheme the motive of which ought to be closely scrutinized by the court. The implication of the apparent refusal by the majority at the Supreme Court to peep behind the veil and to prevent an abuse of the corporate structures was alluded to by Lord Walker where he observed that "[t]he Court's decision will, I fear, make it easier for risk-averse individuals to use artificial corporate structures in order to insulate themselves against responsibility to an insolvent company's unsecured creditors." 80 The minority were strongly averse to the majority decision which apparently reflects undue reliance on Salomon's case. They did not consider the issues in that case as having any bearing on the present, hence Lord Clarke's conviction that Mr Holland was a de facto director does not involve the piercing of the corporate veil but simply the application of the principles identified in the modern cases to the facts of this case.
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The reliance on Salomon, as was done by the majority, was not wrong in itself, what was wrong was the failure, if not deliberate refusal, to consider the exceptions that permit the court to pierce the veil. The invisible hand of Mr Holland as a director of the corporate director of the subject company can only be seen by peeping into the veil of the corporate director as demanded by the circumstances of that case. Unless that is done, whatever was done by Mr Holland would be shielded by the veil which separates him from the Paycheck Directors.
The majority were strongly persuaded by Millet J's suggestion in Re Hydrodam that attendance at board meetings and voting with others would not 'without more' constitute a person a director of any company of which his company is a director. Lord Hope had emphasized in his judgment that the words 'without more' are important. They indicate that the mere fact of acting as a director of a corporate director will not be enough for that individual to become a de facto director of the subject company. amounts to taking all important decisions affecting the relevant company, and seeing that they are carried out, he is acting as a director of that company. It makes no difference that he is also acting as the only active de jure director of a corporate director of the company. 85 The application of the stated principles to the facts gave rise to an inescapable conclusion, as contained in the minority decision, that Mr Holland is a de facto director of the subject company.
It is not in doubt that Mr Holland as the only natural person holding office of the director of the Paycheck Directors (corporate director) was the initiator and executor of all the decisions of the composite companies. His conducts in that case are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 'something more', more so when some of the actions that were seemingly taken by the subject company where patently unlawful.
In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Hall
86 Evans-Lambo J had observed that the words 'without more' as stated by Millet J in Re Hydrodam, does not imply that a director of a corporate director can never be found to be a director of the subject company. An individual, as stated by the judge, could "through his control of a corporate director can constitute himself a de facto director of a subject company. It seems to me that whether or not he does so will depend on what that individual procures the corporate director to do."
In the case under consideration, the facts as revealed have demonstrated that the composite companies were procured to avoid the payment of corporation tax. This is an unlawful conduct which the company would not ordinarily embark upon unless it is propelled by its human organ. Mr Holland being the human organ through which the unlawful act was perpetrated ought to have been considered by the court, as did in the minority decision, as a de facto director of the composite companies.
CONCLUSION
Directors manage the affairs of the company, but it is not every person that is involved in the management of the affairs of the company that is a director. The inclusive nature of the statutory definition of that concept implies that the function performed by the person is of paramount importance in determining whether a person falls within the category of those referred to as directors. What is clear, however, is that to attain the status of director, a person must be operating within the top echelon of the company's administrative hierarchy. The person must, either alone or with others, exercise ultimate control of the management of any part of the company's business. 87 The person's conduct should be seen to strike at the nerve centre from which the activities of the company radiates. 88 In other words, the person must be part of the corporate governance structure of the company and should function in such a manner that his conduct binds the company as an expression of the company's will and not merely as an agent of the company.
A recourse to function in identifying a director invariably entails less emphasis on appointment. While directors should ordinarily be appointed by the shareholders of the company, or in any other manner provided by the Companies Act or the constitution of the company, the non -compliance with the prescriptions laid down by the rules would not provide a defence for the person who functions in the capacity of a director. At common law, persons who function as directors without due appointment are referred to as de facto directors. They are held fully responsible for the consequences of their conducts but without benefits thereof as the position occupied by them are not permissible by law. 89 They are referred to as de facto directors merely to afford protection to those dealing with the company without knowledge of their defective status.
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The recognition of the company by law as a juristic person generally implies that the company, like a natural person, could act as a director of another company. The UK Companies Act permits the appointment of corporate director to the board, so long as the company has at least one director that is a natural person. 91 The South African Companies Act does not permit the appointment of corporate director under any circumstances.
92
Declaring a juristic person ineligible to be appointed director amounts to depriving of the holding companies of one of their weapons of control over their subsidiaries. Section 3(1)(a) of the SA Companies Act could, however, act as panacea by indicating that holding companies can appoint natural persons as directors on the board of their subsidiaries. 93 The issues arising from the split decision of the UK Supreme Court in Holland's case in identifying a de facto director of a subject company that has a corporate director as its only director could provide a faint justification to the position adopted by the legislature in South Africa. But that cannot bury the question as to why a person who can appoint director to the board, lacks the capacity to act by itself as such director. where Lord Cairns held that there having been de facto directors of the company, who were suffered and permitted by the majority of those who signed the articles of association to occupy the position of and act as directors, and the bankers having, in the full belief that these persons were directors, as they were represented to be, honoured the cheques drawn by them, the payment of these cheques is an answer to the action of the liquidator of the company. 91 S 155(1). 92 S 69 (7) . 93 But this too bears its own legal complications when issues of conflict of interest and divided loyalty are considered. subject company, was an extreme expression of the distinct legal personality of the company. It is an "arid formalism" 94 and "artificial" 95 as Mr Holland being the only human director of the corporate director, initiated and executed the policies and affairs of the subject company. The mere peeping into the veil would reveal the finger that pulled the trigger, especially where the structure and conducts of the composite companies were seemingly extraordinary.
Aside from the route of piercing of the corporate veil, Mr Holland's conduct cannot reasonably insulate him from the web of corporate governance of the composite companies. As the sole director of the corporate director, whatever he does in that capacity would most likely strike at the nerve centres from which the activities of the composite companies radiated. That in reality seems to be the major purpose of the entire business scheme. It is believed, however, that with the modification introduced by section 155(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 requiring at least one natural person as director, future decisions bordering on whether a director of corporate director is a de facto director of the subject company would be less tenuous.
